Clinical knowledge, health policies and social identities. Commentary on Lara Rzesnitzek (2013) â€œEarly psychosis as a mirror of biologist controversies in post war German, Anglo-Saxon and Soviet psychiatryâ€ by Nicolas Henckes
OPINION ARTICLE
published: 18 March 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00202
Clinical knowledge, health policies and social identities.
Commentary on Lara Rzesnitzek (2013) “Early psychosis as
a mirror of biologist controversies in post war German,
Anglo-Saxon and Soviet psychiatry”
Nicolas Henckes*
Centre de Recherche Médecine, Sciences, Santé, Santé mentale et Société (CERMES3), CNRS, Villejuif, France
*Correspondence: henckes@vjf.cnrs.fr
Edited by:
Marco Stier, University of Muenster, Germany
Reviewed by:
Markus Rüther, Max Planck Society, Germany
Keywords: early diagnosis, schizophrenia, mental health policy, psychiatric profession, experience of illness
In her wide ranging and thoughtful article
Rzesnitzek (2013), recalls the long, con-
flicting and at times convoluted his-
tory of attempts to describe and delin-
eate the beginnings of schizophrenia. As
Rzesnitzek shows us, this history is at once
scientific, clinical, and political. It involved
practitioners from all over the Western
world as well as from what used to be
called the Eastern world. The reader is
struck by the range of the debates, the
number of conflicting positions as well as
the size of the research effort involved in
these debates. In a way, the debates over the
beginnings of schizophrenia were merely
an abridged version of those over the
nature of the disorder itself. In fact, while
Rzesnitzek herself does not clearly make
this point, her article demonstrates quite
convincingly that the debates over the
beginnings of schizophrenia were debates
over the very definition of the disorder.
What was seen as the manifestation of an
early form of schizophrenia or what was
rather understood as a predisposing con-
dition clearly reflected divergent visions of
the nature and symptoms of the disor-
der. As a sociologist and social historian,
I would add that these visions should in
turn be associated with the settings and
practical conditions in which psychiatrists
saw patients.
What also necessarily strikes the reader
is the open-ended nature of these debates.
There clearly were—and probably still
are—too many uncertainties to overcome
to reach an agreement over criteria for
defining the early phases of schizophrenia.
Given these uncertainties, one may and
probably should wonder what stimulated
the interest of several generations of
psychiatrists in developing tools and cri-
teria for the early diagnosis of schizophre-
nia. Rzesnitzek does not give an answer to
this question, although her article suggests
the fascination that may have been created
among researchers by questions surround-
ing the nature of what a recent book has
called “the sublime object of psychiatry”
(Woods, 2011). In the remainder of this
commentary, I prefer to reflect on some
of the consequences of the debates for the
people concerned. I will specifically com-
ment on two dimensions of the story of
early psychosis, which Rzesnitzek does not
explore at length.
The first concerns the policy and polit-
ical dimensions of the story. Seen from
Germany, this may not be an important
perspective. Nazism, with its programs of
sterilization and euthanasia, brought into
disrepute both a generation of psychia-
trists and ways of thinking about mental
disorders, which probably prevented any
further efforts at developing preventive
practices and policies in the field of men-
tal health in Germany after World War II.
However, inmany countries and in various
ways, both mental hygiene and eugeni-
cist movements remained strong players in
the psychiatric field until well after 1945
(Kevles, 1985; Grob, 1991; Rose, 2001;
Bashford and Levine, 2010). The idea of
mental health as a resource to be pre-
served and of mental health professionals
as contributors to the public good have
been major aspects of psychiatric think-
ing in most Western countries after World
War II. In many countries, these ideas have
translated into programs in primary pre-
vention, especially with children (Jones,
1999; Stewart, 2013). On a darker side,
sterilization programs continued in the US
as well as in Northern Europe until at
least the late 1970s (Broberg and Roll-
Hansen, 2005; Largent, 2008). To what
extent researchers in the field of early diag-
nosis or genetic psychiatry aimed at con-
tributing to these policies is not clear, just
as it is not clear what sort of prevention
practices have been developed from their
research.
Today’s practitioners in the field of
early intervention have developed a strong
awareness of the policy implications of
their work, and a segment of the field has
even developed a commitment to develop-
ing policies that may help to better screen,
diagnose, and treat schizophrenia in its
early phase. The International Declaration
on Youth Mental Health launched in 2012
by a group of youth psychiatrist is the
last and most spectacular action in this
direction (Coughlan et al., 2013). Yet
these actions rely on a concept of men-
tal health policy which differs in major
ways from earlier proposals. While the
mental hygiene movement was built upon
the idea that the psychiatrist was the
only expert in defining and enforcing pre-
vention practices, today’s mental health
movement insists on the necessary par-
ticipation of the people concerned in
their own treatment and care. In a way,
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concern for mental health affects all of us,
and may be a way of life for the most
vulnerable. The psychiatric profession is
only one actor in the drama of mental
health, and often doesn’t play the most
important role.
This leads to my second commentary,
which concerns transformations in the
experience of developing schizophrenia as
it relates to the changing experiences of
being young and becoming adult. The
history of schizophrenia as a “coming-of-
age” disorder remains largely to be writ-
ten. Yet, as Rzesnitzek reminds us, age
is an obvious component of this disor-
der. The label for the most iconic form
of schizophrenia, “hebephrenia,” was his-
torically proposed by German psychia-
trists Kahlbaum and Hecker to label a
disorder typically characterized as affect-
ing young people (Kraam and Phillips,
2012). The term was not kept in DSM
III, but the definition of schizophrenia
in this manual entailed as a criterion an
age of onset before 45—a criterion, how-
ever, that was removed in subsequent edi-
tions (American Psychiatric Association,
1980). More recently, the concept of an
“at-risk mental state” targets young people
between 16 and 30 (McGorry et al., 2003).
And in fact, current practices and policies
of early intervention are built upon the
premise that young adulthood is an age
of maximal vulnerability to mental health
disorders.
There is nothing here to surprise a
sociologist. As a large body of scholar-
ship in sociology and psychology has now
shown, the age between 20 and 30 has
emerged as a new life phase character-
ized as an age of uncertainties, both exis-
tential and economic (Booth et al., 1999;
Arnett, 2001; Van de Velde, 2008; Booth,
2012). At the same time, it is clear that
for most young people these uncertainties,
however distressing they might be, will
never translate into a problem as dramatic
as a major psychiatric disorder. The char-
acterization of early psychosis as a con-
dition affecting young people should be
understood in this context. In fact, many
mental health professionals see a contin-
uum between minor mental health prob-
lems that may develop as a consequence
of the existential turmoil of young adult-
hood, and major psychiatric disorders—
or, at least, they are not able to differentiate
between a minor mental health prob-
lem and the initial signs of what may
turn out to be a major psychiatric dis-
order (see for instance Patrick McGorry’s
model of clinical staging: McGorry et al.,
2007). In turn, it is probable that early
intervention practices and policies will
affect our vision of young adulthood—
including young people’s visions of them-
selves. In North America, several social
movements initiated and led by young
people are now trying to make a case for
youth mental health on academic cam-
puses, and a new generation of youth
mental health activists has emerged who
are beginning to play an important role
in advocating early intervention. In this
regard, resilience to early psychosis is per-
haps becoming a way for a new gen-
eration of young people to build their
identity.
Both these discussions point to the fact
that medical entities have a social life
that extends well beyond the jurisdiction
of medicine. As medicine legitimates the
existence of a phenomenon as a medical
entity, it also leaves open the possibility
for many other actors to use this def-
inition for their own purpose—whether
these actors are politicians, administra-
tors, activists or patients. This is why
discussions on the dangers of psychi-
atric labeling and on ethical safeguards
to help psychiatrists anticipate and pre-
vent the consequences of their judgment
may not necessarily always be effective.
What patients and society at large do
withmedical concepts usually goes beyond
whatmedical men and women—including
ethicists—imagine. However conscious of
the implications of their judgments med-
ical practitioners may be, what becomes
of these judgments will certainly be
far beyond their reach. Philosopher Ian
Hacking has proposed the concept of
“looping effect” to describe the transfor-
mations which people labeled with a med-
ical diagnosis may in turn create within
these diagnostic labels once they have
adopted them as their own (Hacking,
1995, 1999). Historian Charles Rosenberg
also wrote about the “tyranny of diag-
nosis” to point to both the necessity of
diagnosis in medical practice and the bur-
den of its often unwanted and unex-
pected consequences (Rosenberg, 2002).
This may be even more complicated
for the medical profession in situations
such as early intervention where the
medical status of a category remains
disputed, although this category never-
theless has a life of its own outside
medicine.
A final striking dimension of the story
told by Rzesnitzek is the existence of local
variations in the conceptualization and
use of a diagnostic category such as early
psychosis. This aspect would probably
have been even stronger if Rzesnitzek had
had the chance to describe actual research
and clinical practices that have developed
around this category in different countries
at different periods. Indeed, such vari-
ations not only reflect different clinical
traditions, but also different approaches
to the practical issue of treating people
and different approaches to psychiatric
research. The very German history told
by Rzesnitzek has a lot to do with the
specificity of psychiatric research in that
country and its organization around the
psychiatric clinic as an academic insti-
tution. In contrast, the funding of US
psychiatric research by the American
Congress may have made it much more
sensitive to pressures from the social
world. However, from my two previous
series of remarks, one could also infer
that these variations also owe much to
the diverse ways in which the people con-
cerned act in relation to their labels. This
layer of complexity adds to those already
present in Rzesnitzek’s article.
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